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achieve GHG reductions, and exclude from an offset program 
those reductions that could be more cost-effectively achieved 
through other policy mechanisms? This brief argues the latter. 
Carbon offsets should be considered as an important element 
of an overall strategy to achieve national GHG reductions at the 
lowest cost to the economy, but cost containment should not be 
viewed only from the perspective of capped entities. The authors 
review some of the decisions policymakers will need to make 
as they consider designing the offsets component as part of a 
cap and trade program. Section I describes the basic criteria for 
certifying carbon offsets. Section II assesses differences in the 
ease with which various project types can satisfy these criteria. 
Section III discusses the implications of these differences for 
decisions about whether to include certain types of activities in 
a carbon offset program or address them through other policies. 
Section IV provides conclusions and recommendations.
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Carbon offset programs require the application of rigor-
ous quantifi cation, verifi cation, and enforcement criteria 
in order to ensure that the integrity of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) caps is not compromised. Some types of climate 
change mitigation activities—especially those involving 
soil or forest carbon sequestration—are less likely to 
meet these criteria than others. It is possible to overcome 
these challenges, but doing so entails costs that might be 
avoided if these GHG reductions were achieved through 
other policies and measures. Deciding which types of GHG 
reductions to include in a carbon offset program should 
therefore be part of a broader strategy to achieve economy-
wide GHG reductions at the lowest overall cost. 
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Introduction
A comprehensive cap-and-trade program requires a number of 
policy design decisions. These involve setting emissions targets, 
determining which sources will be regulated under the cap, 
how pollution permits will be assigned or auctioned, and how 
to generate emissions reductions from GHG pollution sources 
not included in the cap. Carbon offsets are reductions from 
uncapped sectors or sources that are used for compliance with 
the cap. Offsets are likely to play a crucial role in the design 
of a U.S. cap-and-trade program for limiting GHG emissions 
because they can help contain costs and expand compliance 
options. However, offsets are only one mechanism for achiev-
ing reductions at uncapped sources, and should be considered 
alongside other measures, such as complementary regulations 
(including GHG performance standards) or subsidies. 
In principle, any GHG reductions (or increases in carbon 
sequestration) that occur at sources or sinks “outside the 
cap” can be used as offsets within a cap-and-trade system.1 
However, not all GHG reductions are easy to certify as offsets. 
These include GHG reductions from forestry and agriculture 
activities, which face larger challenges in meeting basic offset 
certifi cation criteria than activities in other sectors (e.g., proj-
ects involving methane capture and destruction). Overcoming 
these challenges may add costs that could be avoided by using 
other policies and mechanisms. 
Policymakers must therefore confront a tradeoff in deciding 
whether certain kinds of GHG reductions should count as 
carbon offsets. Should they seek maximal inclusion of offset op-
tions as part of a cap-and-trade package in order to provide the 
greatest amount of fl exibility and cost-containment for capped 
entities? Or should they think about the most effi cient means to 
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Section I – Carbon Offset Criteria 
What are carbon offsets?
A “carbon offset” is a reduction in GHG emissions or an in-
crease in carbon sequestration2 that is achieved to compensate 
for, or “offset,” GHG emissions occurring at other sources.3 In 
a cap-and-trade system, carbon offsets allow emissions from 
regulated (“capped”) sources to increase above levels set by the 
cap, on the premise that those increases are compensated by 
reductions achieved at unregulated (“uncapped”) sources (Fig-
ure 1). Because reducing emissions at unregulated sources can 
be less costly than at capped sources, carbon offsets can lower 
the cost of achieving the cap’s overall net emissions goal.4 
In an emissions market, carbon offsets can be traded in the form 
of certifi ed “credits.”5 One credit usually denotes a GHG reduc-
tion equivalent to one metric ton of carbon dioxide (CO2). In 
most cases, offset credits are issued for reductions achieved by 
specifi c projects, i.e., “offset projects.” In order to receive credits, 
the project owners must demonstrate that a project has reduced 
emissions according to predefi ned rules and procedures. These 
procedures are designed to ensure that an offset represents a 
real reduction, thereby preserving the integrity of the cap. In 
principle, a wide variety of projects can generate carbon offsets, 
although the list will vary depending on which sources are cov-
ered by the cap and are therefore ineligible as offsets.6 
Examples of offset projects include, but are not limited to:
• Capturing methane created by landfi lls and fl aring it 
(methane emitted from landfi lls is a potent gas in the at-
mosphere) or using it to produce energy (thus displacing 
fossil fuel combustion);
• Installing equipment at chemical factories to capture and 
destroy industrial GHGs, such as HFCs or N2O. 
• Switching from high carbon-intensity fuels (e.g., coal) to 
fuels with low or zero net carbon emissions (e.g., wind 
power) for small-scale energy production or transportation.
• Improving the effi ciency of energy production from fossil 
fuels, e.g., by upgrading commercial or industrial boilers, 
or utilizing opportunities to combine the production of 
heat and power.
• Deploying equipment or appliances that use less energy 
(e.g., high-effi ciency air conditioners or fl uorescent light 
bulbs) and reduce demand for fossil fuel-based energy.
• Planting trees or adopting forestry or land management 
practices (such as extending the length of time until har-
vest, or switching to no-tillage agriculture) that remove 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and sequester it.
Criteria for carbon offsets
To have a functioning market for carbon offsets, clear rules 
and procedures are required to defi ne their creation and 
certifi cation. Although these rules and procedures can differ 
from program to program, most of the literature on carbon 
offsets refers to a core set of criteria derived from guidelines 
established under the federal Clean Air Act. Specifi cally, offsets 
must be “real, surplus (or additional), verifi able, permanent, 
and enforceable” in order to maintain the integrity of an emis-
sions trading system.7 Interpretations of these criteria vary, but 
their essence can be summarized as follows:
Real 
An offset credit must represent an actual net GHG reduction, 
and should not be an artifact of incomplete or inaccurate 
emissions accounting. In practice, this means methods for 
quantifying reductions should be conservative in order to avoid 
overstating them. It also means that the accounting of a proj-
ect’s effect on GHG emissions must be comprehensive.8 For 
example, some projects may reduce GHGs at one source, only 
to cause emissions to increase at other sources. A frequently 
cited example is a forest protection project that simply shifts 
logging activities to other forest land, causing little or even 
no net decrease in carbon emitted from logging. Unintended 
increases in GHG emissions that occur outside of a project’s 
boundaries, but are caused by that project, are often referred 
to as “leakage.” For carbon offsets to be real, they must be 
quantifi ed in ways that account for leakage. 
Additional 
Only GHG reductions that are a response to the incentives 
created by a carbon offset market should be certifi ed as offsets. 
Activities that would occur regardless of an offset market (e.g., 
those that result from “business-as-usual” practices) should 
not be counted. The rationale for this is straightforward. The 
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basic premise of carbon offsets is that they maintain net GHG 
emissions at a level set by a trading system’s cap. Total emis-
sions should be the same with or without an offset program. 
Because offset credits allow regulated sources in a cap-and-
trade system to increase their emissions by a corresponding 
amount (as in Figure 1), offset reductions must be “additional” 
in order to maintain net emission levels. Crediting reductions 
that would occur in the absence of a cap would result in higher 
total emissions, as capped emissions would increase without a 
corresponding reduction in uncapped emissions.
Although the premise behind this general concept (called “ad-
ditionality”) is straightforward, it is diffi cult to put into practice. 
Determining which projects, and therefore which reductions, 
would not have occurred in the absence of an offset market is 
frequently challenging and always subjective. Within existing 
carbon offset programs, there are two basic approaches to de-
termining “additionality:” project-specifi c and standardized.9
1.  Project-specifi c approaches seek to assess whether a proj-
ect differs from a hypothetical baseline scenario in which 
there is no carbon offset market. Generally, a project and 
its possible alternatives are subjected to a comparative 
analysis of their implementation barriers and/or expected 
benefi ts (e.g., fi nancial returns). If an option other than 
the project itself is identifi ed as the most likely alterna-
tive for the business-as-usual (or “baseline”) scenario, the 
project is considered additional. The Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a global carbon 
offset program for projects in developing countries, re-
quires project-specifi c additionality tests.
2.  Standardized approaches evaluate projects against consis-
tent criteria designed to exclude non-additional projects 
and include additional ones. For example, standardized 
tests could involve determinations that a project: 
• Is not mandated by law;
• Is not a “least-cost” option (as defi ned by regulators);
• Is not common practice (as defi ned by regulators);
• Involves a particular type of technology;
• Is of a certain size;
• Is initiated after a certain date; or
• Has an emission rate lower than most others in its 
class (e.g., relative to a performance standard)
From a regulatory perspective, standardized additionality 
tests are advantageous. Relative to project-specifi c tests, they 
can reduce transaction costs for project developers, alleviate 
uncertainties for investors, and increase the transparency 
and consistency of regulatory decisions.10 Several U.S.-based 
carbon offset programs–including the California Climate Ac-
tion Registry, the Chicago Climate Exchange, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the northeastern United States, 
and U.S. EPA’s Climate Leaders program–have adopted stan-
dardized additionality tests. 
Standardized tests are not always easy to devise, however. 
They are particularly diffi cult to implement when there is 
high uncertainty about baseline conditions, e.g., when it is 
not clear in most cases whether a certain type of project or 
its alternatives would be implemented in the absence of an 
offset market. For projects that extend harvesting rotations 
on managed forest land, for example, it may be diffi cult to 
consistently distinguish business-as-usual from “additional” 
activities using standard criteria because of the wide range 
of circumstances under which these projects can occur. This 
could be a factor in deciding whether such projects should be 
included in a carbon offset program or supported instead by 
some other policy or incentive.11
Verifi able
Carbon offsets should result from projects whose performance 
and effects can be readily monitored and verifi ed. Verifi cation 
is necessary to demonstrate that emission reductions have 
actually occurred and can therefore be used to offset emission 
increases at regulated sources. Verifi cation helps ensure that 
offset reductions are “real” and not overestimated. Because 
of the importance of maintaining net emissions levels within a 
trading system, projects whose effects are diffi cult to measure 
or verify may not be suitable for generating carbon offsets. 
Permanent
Once GHGs are emitted into the atmosphere, they reside there 
more or less permanently.12 Accordingly, the offset emissions 
reduction must also be permanent. Permanence is usually only 
an issue for GHG sequestration or storage projects, as their 
effects can be reversed over time. For example, in forestry or 
agricultural carbon sequestration projects, carbon stored in 
trees or soils can be released to the atmosphere due to fi res, 
harvesting, land-use changes, or other disturbances. In these 
cases, a mechanism is required to make reversible reductions 
or removals functionally equivalent to permanent reductions 
for the purpose of issuing offset credits. There are at least 
three possible ways to acheive this goal:
1. Issuing credits on a “discounted” basis. With this approach, 
less than a full credit is awarded for each ton of GHG 
reduction. For example, credits might be discounted to 
take into account expected future losses of sequestered 
or stored carbon over a certain time period. 
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2. Issuing temporary or expiring credits. Credits for revers-
ible reductions can be made to expire at a predefi ned 
date, or canceled if verifi cation indicates that a reversal 
has occurred. In both cases, the holder of the credits 
(rather than the project developer) would have to procure 
replacement credits or allowances in order to remain in 
compliance with the cap-and-trade system. This approach 
has been adopted by the CDM for reforestation and af-
forestation projects. 
3. Establishing an insurance or buffer system. Buyers or 
sellers of reversible reductions could be required to buy 
“insurance” in some form to compensate for reversals, 
or establish carbon sequestration buffers that serve the 
same function. There are many ways these mechanisms 
can be structured, and they may be combined with re-
quirements for landowners to commit to maintaining car-
bon stocks over the long term (e.g., through easements). 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the U.S. has 
adopted this approach for reforestation projects. 
It is worth noting that all of these methods for addressing 
reversible reductions have the effect of either increasing 
costs for project developers (insurance and buffer systems) or 
reducing the amount of compensation they receive per ton of 
CO2 reduced (discounting and expiring credits), and therefore 
lessen the cost-reduction benefi t of the offsets. But addressing 
reversibility is critical if carbon sequestration offsets are to 
be credited on the same basis as offsets involving permanent 
emission reductions.
TABLE 1 Climate Change Programs with Offset Quantifi cation Protocols
Program Description Types of Offset Protocols Notes
The Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM)a
The CDM is the largest offset 
program established under the 
Kyoto Protocol, and is currently 
the largest offset program in the 
world in terms of volume mar-
ket value. CDM offset credits 
may be used for compliance 
with emissions targets set under 
the Kyoto Protocol.
Well over 100 methodologies 
covering renewable energy, 
energy effi ciency, fuel switch-
ing, methane destruction, 
industrial gas destruction, and 
reforestation/ afforestation in a 
wide range of applications and 
sectors.
Protocols have been designed to apply across a wide 
range of circumstances in developing countries; these 
could be adopted and possibly standardized in a U.S. 
context. The CDM’s project-specifi c approach to ad-
ditionality has come under scrutiny recently for being 
diffi cult to enforce consistently.b
The Regional 
Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative 
(RGGI)c
RGGI is a mandatory cap-and-
trade program in the Northeast-
ern United States due to begin 
operation in 2009.
• Landfi ll methane capture and 
destruction
• Reduction in emissions of 
sulfur hexafl uoride (SF6)
• Sequestration of carbon due 
to afforestation
• Avoided/reduced natural gas 
or oil combustion due to end 
use energy effi ciency
• Agricultural manure manage-
ment operations
Protocols are highly standardized; some parties 
have complained that they are too restrictive.d The 
protocols do not explicitly address leakage. Addition-
ality rules only exclude projects required by law, that 
receive public subsidies, or that are double-counted 
under other programs. These criteria may be more 
effective for some project categories (e.g., methane 
destruction) than others (e.g., afforestation). Perma-
nence is addressed by requiring long-term easements 
on forest land, but there is no insurance mechanism 
for reversals.
The U.S. EPA 
Climate Leaders 
Programe
Climate Leaders is an EPA 
industry-government partner-
ship that works with companies 
to develop comprehensive 
climate change strategies and 
has developed several offset 
methodologies based on the 
WRI/WBCSD Project Protocol.
• Reforestation/ afforestation
• Commercial boilers
• Industrial boilers
• Landfi ll methane
• Manure management 
(anaerobic digesters)
• Bus fl eet upgrades
The offsets component of the Climate Leaders pro-
gram is new and still under development. Protocols 
have explicitly adopted a “performance standard” 
approach to determining project additionality, and 
project types were selected according to their suit-
ability for this approach. Rules to address leakage and 
permanence are still under development.
The California 
Climate Action 
Registry (CCAR)f
CCAR is a non-profi t, voluntary 
registry for GHG emissions 
originally formed by the State 
of California. It is developing a 
series of carbon offset proto-
cols under its Climate Action 
Reserve program.
• Forestry conservation
• Conservation-based forest 
management
• Reforestation
• Manure management
• Landfi ll methane 
CCAR has emphasized the development of protocols 
with standardized baseline and additionality criteria. 
CCAR’s forestry protocols are currently being updat-
ed to expand their applicability, address permanence, 
and account for leakage effects.
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claim the emissions sequestered in forest products–as might 
the owners of the products themselves. Regulatory rules 
must establish who may claim the emission reductions, who 
is ultimately responsible for ensuring project performance, 
who is responsible for project verifi cation, and who is liable 
in the case of reversals.
Enforceable
Carbon offsets should be backed by regulations and track-
ing systems that defi ne their creation and ownership and 
provide for transparency. Clear defi nitions of ownership are 
essential for enforceability and to avoid double counting. For 
example, a forest owner and a mill owner might both want to 
The Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange (CCX)g
The CCX is a U.S.-based vol-
untary emissions trading system 
for GHGs. Participants take 
legally binding commitments to 
reduce their emissions and can 
do so through the purchase of 
carbon offsets certifi ed under 
CCX protocols.
• Agricultural methane 
(manure management)
• Agricultural soil carbon
• Energy effi ciency and fuel 
switching
• Forestry carbon
• Landfi ll methane
• Renewable energy
• Coal mine methane
• Rangeland soil carbon
• Ozone depleting substance 
destruction
Most of the CCX’s protocols are highly standardized. 
For example, there are pre-specifi ed crediting rates 
for eligible projects. Permanence for forestry projects 
is addressed by requiring a commitment to “long-
term maintenance” of carbon stocks, as well as setting 
aside a 20 percent buffer to compensate for reversals. 
A similar insurance buffer is required for soil carbon 
projects, but project owners need only commit to 
maintaining carbon stocks for 5 years. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests the CCX’s additionality criteria have 
not worked well for soil carbon projects.h Leakage 
effects are not explicitly accounted for.
The New South 
Wales Green-
house Gas 
Abatement 
Scheme (GGAS)i
The GGAS in Australia is one 
of the fi rst mandatory GHG 
trading systems and bases 
compliance on credits issued for 
a variety of project types.
• Low-emission electricity 
generation
• End-use energy effi ciency
• Forestry sequestration
• GHG reductions at industrial 
facilities
The GGAS protocols are all highly standardized, 
but largely tailored to circumstances in New South 
Wales; they may be diffi cult to apply elsewhere. 
Forestry project landowners are required to maintain 
average carbon stocks at a constant level for 100 
years but GGAS has no explicit provisions to address 
reversals or account for leakage.
The Alberta 
Offset Systemj
The Alberta Offset System in 
Canada was established to fa-
cilitate compliance with provin-
cial legislation requiring large 
industrial facilities to reduce 
their GHG emissions. A variety 
of offset protocols have been 
adopted under the program.
Sixteen protocols completed, 
including:
• Livestock methane emissions
• Soil carbon sequestration
• Methane reductions from 
organic waste 
• Biofuels
• Enhanced oil recovery 
• Waste-heat recovery
• Energy effi ciency
• Afforestation 
• Others
Protocols have been developed via public-private 
partnership, and contain both standardized and 
project-specifi c elements. There are no explicit ad-
ditionality tests or criteria (although projects required 
by law are not eligible).
Leakage effects are addressed through the identifi ca-
tion of sources and sinks affected by project. Perma-
nence is addressed through discounting.
Notes
 a. http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/approved.html
 b. Schneider, L., 2007. Is The CDM Fulfi lling Its Environmental And Sustainable Development Objectives? An Evaluation Of The CDM And 
Options For Improvement. World Wildlife Fund / Oeko Institut.
 c. http://www.rggi.org
 d. Lee, C., et al. (forthcoming). Domestic and International Offset Programs: A Review and Assessment. Stockholm Environment Institute.   
 e. http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/index.html
 f. http://www.climateregistry.org/offsets.html
 g. http://www.chicagoclimateexchange.com/
 h. Goodell, J., 2006. “Capital Pollution Solution?” in New York Times Magazine, July 30, 2006; Samuelsohn, D., 2006. “Farmers Find NewCash 
Crop in Emissions Trading Schemes,” Greenwire, June 22, 2006.
 i. http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/default.asp
 j. http://www.carbonoffsetsolutions.ca/policyandregulation/abOffsetSystem.html
TABLE 1 continued
Program Description Types of Offset Protocols Notes
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Writing the rules for offsets
To create a functioning market for carbon offsets, the cri-
teria outlined above must be defi ned in a set of operational 
standards, and administered by a credible regulatory body 
responsible for certifying and issuing offset credits. Standards 
are required in order to create a carbon offset “commodity” 
that is as uniform as possible, i.e., a high degree of certainty 
that one offset credit refl ects one ton of CO2-equivalent emis-
sion reductions or sequestration. There are several existing 
“standards” for carbon offsets. The challenge is deciding which 
ones, if any, may be suffi ciently stringent and credible for a 
U.S. cap-and-trade program. 
Internationally, an extensive amount of work has been done 
to clarify the basic requirements of carbon offset accounting. 
In particular, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol for Project Account-
ing (“Project Protocol”), developed by the World Resources 
Institute (WRI) and World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), and the ISO 14064 (Part 2) standard 
developed by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion both provide a general framework for quantifying emis-
sion reductions from offset projects.13 A truly standardized 
commodity for carbon offsets, however, requires elaborating 
these general requirements into “methodologies,” or protocols, 
aimed at specifi c types of projects. Such protocols streamline 
the quantifi cation process, taking into account data require-
ments and analysis relevant to a particular project type.
The task of developing protocols has fallen to a number of 
individual programs that verify and certify offsets. The largest 
of these is the CDM. Table 1 summarizes the types of publicly 
available protocols and methodologies developed by the CDM 
and other programs around the world. 
Table 1 indicates potential shortcomings in the protocols 
developed by other programs to date. In the context of a U.S. 
cap-and-trade system, federal regulators would need to thor-
oughly evaluate whether the protocols developed under these 
programs are suitable for a regulatory offsets program. Such 
an evaluation would need to take into account the accuracy 
of their quantifi cation methods, as well as their suffi ciency in 
addressing additionality, leakage, and permanence. One of the 
challenges in designing offset protocols is that they require 
balancing different policy goals. Protocols that are too strin-
gent may end up excluding good offset projects and raising 
overall compliance costs. Lenient protocols may result in an 
overestimation of GHG reductions and therefore undermine 
the integrity of an emissions cap. Ideally, protocols should be 
developed and adopted according to how well they achieve 
desired policy outcomes for an emissions trading system, 
including objectives for environmental integrity, transaction 
costs, and administrative costs.14 Federal regulators will need 
to carefully decide whether existing protocols strike the right 
balance, and adopt or modify them accordingly. 
Section II – How Different Project 
Types Fare
Which reductions to include in an offset program?
Only emission reductions at sources outside the emissions cap 
can truly qualify as offsets. While it may be desirable to provide 
an extra incentive for reductions at some covered sources, 
“credit” for such reductions must be given, if at all, through 
some form of allowance allocation rather than the creation of 
offset credits.15 
In addition, it may be desirable to exclude reductions from 
activities that are likely to have adverse social, economic, or 
environmental effects (e.g., activities that spread invasive spe-
cies or increase the use of harmful herbicides). This is probably 
best accomplished through general eligibility criteria applied to 
individual offset projects (such as requiring that they undergo 
an environmental impact review), rather than the exclusion of 
whole categories of projects because, in most cases, projects 
can be individually designed to avoid adverse consequences.
Beyond these considerations, there is in theory no reason to 
limit the types of projects allowed in an offset program as long 
as they can meet the basic criteria outlined above (i.e., real, 
additional, verifi able, permanent, and enforceable).16 However, 
some types of projects will face greater risks and uncertainties 
relative to these criteria than others. The question becomes 
whether it makes sense to exclude some types of projects when 
the cost of overcoming these uncertainties is high. 
Not all project types are equal
The credibility of a carbon offset largely depends on the level of 
confi dence one has in its quantifi cation, additionality, verifi ca-
tion, permanence, and enforceability. The risks and uncertain-
ties for carbon offsets fall into four broad categories:
1. Measurement uncertainty: uncertainty associated with mon-
itoring and verifying a project’s performance and its effect 
on GHG emissions or sequestration. Accurate measure-
ment is easier for some types of projects than others. Mea-
suring methane captured from a landfi ll, for example, can 
be done very accurately using gas fl ow meters. Measuring 
automobile emissions affected by a public transportation 
project, on the other hand, would be nearly impossible; 
such emissions would have to be estimated using surveys 
and models, with a much higher range of uncertainty.
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2. Baseline uncertainty: uncertainty about a project’s 
business-as-usual (baseline) emissions and its additional-
ity.17 Baseline uncertainty will be higher for projects that 
have numerous possible alternatives and for projects that 
provide signifi cant compensation or revenue aside from 
their emission reductions. 
3. Leakage potential: the likelihood of unintended increases 
in emissions caused by a project. Leakage can add signifi -
cant uncertainty to a project because it is often diffi cult 
to monitor and quantify. Some types of projects are more 
prone to leakage than others. (See Table 2.)
4. Reversibility risk: the potential for reversal of a project’s 
emission reductions (which raises concerns about perma-
nence). Reversibility is only a concern for projects whose 
emissions benefi ts result from carbon sequestration.
Different types of offset projects will face different intrinsic 
levels of uncertainty and risk in each of these four categories. 
Table 2 illustrates how some different types of projects com-
pare, based on qualitative analysis and a preliminary survey 
of carbon offset quantifi cation literature. Further studies are 
needed to develop a full quantitative comparison for different 
project types, but there are generally discernible differences. 
In particular, many types of forestry and agriculture carbon 
sequestration projects will face greater measurement diffi culty, 
baseline uncertainty, leakage potential, and reversibility risk, 
making these types of projects much harder to credit as off-
sets. However, these are also categories of great interest in the 
political debate, given their potential to provide a relatively 
large supply of reductions as well as income for their sectors. 
There is therefore signifi cant interest in further research and 
attention to the development of viable protocols for these 
project types. 
Addressing risks and uncertainties can raise costs
Projects with relatively high intrinsic quantifi cation diffi culties 
can yield credible offsets if the issues are adequately addressed. 
However, doing so will usually raise costs (and therefore lessen 
the cost-reduction benefi t) of offset projects. For example:
TABLE 2 Examples of Project Types and Uncertainties
Project Type
Measurement 
Diffi culty
Baseline 
Uncertainty
Leakage 
Potential
Reversibility 
Risk
Total Relative 
Uncertainty & Risk
Landfi ll methane fl aring Lowa Lowb None No Low
Boiler effi ciency improvement Lowc Medium/Highd Low No Medium-Low
Afforestation Mediume Low/Medium Mediumf Yes Medium
Soil carbon sequestration Medium to Very Highg Mediumh Low/Medium?i Yes Medium-High
Avoided deforestation Medium/Highe Highj Highk Yes High
Bus rapid transit system Medium/High Highl Lowm No Medium-High
Notes
a.   Captured methane can be measured accurately with fl ow meters, whose uncertainty range is typically much less than 1%.18 
b.   There are few other reasons for undertaking this kind of project (e.g., unless required by regulation), so there is little uncertainty about ad-
ditionality. Landfi ll methane projects have a relatively high likelihood of generating real and additional emission reductions compared to other 
project types, even where captured gas is used to supply energy.19
c.   Boiler fuel consumption can be easily tracked and accurately measured.
d.   In one study of boiler projects involving district heating, uncertainty was estimated at +/- 45% for baseline CO2 emissions.20 
e.   Carbon stocks in forests may be subject to medium-to-high uncertainty depending on methods, spatial scales, and forest types.21 
f.  Leakage for afforestation projects in the United States may range as high as 42%, depending on the region.22
g.   Measurement uncertainties for soil carbon have been estimated at up to 100%, but may be as low as 6% (single standard deviation).23 The 
uncertainty range depends greatly on the spatial scale considered.24
h.   There may be multiple reasons for undertaking activities that sequester carbon, such as no-tillage practices. In some areas no-tillage is com-
mon practice.
i.  Depends on how tillage practices affect crop yields and whether there are associated shifts in crop production on other lands. 
j.   Forestry and land use baselines can be very diffi cult to predict. Uncertainty ranges for baseline carbon may be well over 50% in some areas.25
k.   Leakage for avoided deforestation projects in the Untied States may be as high as 90%, depending on the region.26 
l.  Emissions from urban vehicle traffi c must be modeled; typical uncertainty ranges for simple models are around +/- 30%.27 Many variables 
must be taken into account and modeled to produce accurate estimates of baseline emissions.28 
m. Depends on specifi c project. Estimates for existing projects are low (e.g., 3%).29
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• Addressing measurement uncertainties may require 
more costly measurement and verifi cation practices or 
the use of conservative estimates or discounts for quanti-
fi ed reductions (which raise the cost per ton of creditable 
reductions). 
• Addressing baseline uncertainties may require more 
rigorous analysis and additionality tests (raising costs for 
project developers and/or program administrators), or 
application of conservative estimates that err on the side 
of under-counting emission reductions.
• Addressing leakage generally requires the incorporation 
of project elements designed to mitigate it,30 or the ap-
plication of conservative methods to estimate its impact.
• Addressing reversibility requires the adoption of mecha-
nisms (e.g., discounted or temporary credits) that will 
either increase costs or reduce compensation to project 
owners.
Project types with higher levels of quantifi cation risk and 
uncertainty are likely to incur higher transaction costs for 
every ton of CO2 reduced. No studies have yet attempted 
to quantify the size of these costs under a strict regulatory 
program.31 However, they may have important consequences 
for how these projects fare in a GHG market. Furthermore, 
it may take time to develop protocols that effectively mitigate 
uncertainty, which may delay projects’ entry into the market. 
Finally, even when the added costs amount to less than a dollar 
per ton of CO2, they could create many millions of dollars of 
added investment burden across the entire market for carbon 
offsets. Modeling estimates of the cost-reduction benefi ts of 
including offsets in a cap-and-trade program do not typically 
factor in these transaction costs.
Section III – A Comprehensive Approach 
to Targeting Emission Reductions
Alternative Policies for Reducing Uncapped 
Emissions
For some types of climate change mitigation activities, the 
cost of rigorously quantifying and verifying GHG reductions 
may be signifi cant. Viewed strictly from the standpoint of an 
offset market, this may not seem to be a major obstacle. If the 
market can bear the costs and pay project owners enough to 
make a profi t, why should they matter? These costs do matter, 
however, if lower cost options exist for controlling the same 
emissions. Where costs can be avoided, as in the examples 
below, more reductions can be achieved for the same total 
expenditure of resources.
There are at least three options for achieving GHG reductions 
at uncapped sources that could potentially avoid the costs as-
sociated with quantifying and certifying carbon offsets. The 
fi rst is to include these sources under the cap; however, the 
quantifi cation challenges described in this paper (as well as 
other considerations) often make coverage under the cap in-
feasible. The second option is traditional regulation. In some 
cases, it may make sense for federal, state, or local governments 
to simply require the implementation of emission-reducing 
activities. For example, producers of industrial waste gases 
could simply be required to capture and destroy them. The 
advantage of this approach is that it can be comprehensive 
(covering all relevant facilities or installations), and it does 
not require complex emissions accounting. Regulators would 
still have to verify and enforce activities, and would want to 
consider whether regulations could result in emissions leakage, 
but administrative and overhead costs could be much lower 
than for certifying carbon offsets.
The third broad policy option is the use of incentive payments 
to fund emission reductions.32 Incentive payments could take 
numerous forms, including the allocation of tradable allow-
ances from a cap-and-trade program, allocation of revenue 
from auctioning allowances, general subsidies, or even tax 
credits. Why would using incentive payments reduce costs? 
Because unlike offsets, reductions achieved through incen-
tive payments would not be used to compensate for increased 
emissions from capped sources, and therefore would not have 
to be subject to the same scrutiny in terms of measurement, 
additionality, leakage, and reversibility. 
For example:
• Measurements of the effects of funded activities would 
be primarily for informational purposes, and would not 
have to meet the same degree of accuracy needed to 
ensure that quantifi ed reductions are truly offsetting 
emissions on a ton-for-ton basis. 
• While it would be desirable to fund “additional” activi-
ties, developing and applying complicated additionality 
tests would not be necessary from an environmental 
standpoint. 
• Verifi cation of funded activities would still be necessary, 
but could be limited to a simple confi rmation that activities 
are being undertaken rather than precise quantifi cation.
• Long-term carbon sequestration would be desirable and 
could be encouraged, but designing complicated insur-
ance mechanisms to put carbon sequestration on equal 
9 W O R L D  R E S O U R C E S  I N S T I T U T ED e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8
Outside the Cap: Opportunities and Limitations of Greenhouse Gas Offsets
footing with permanent emission reductions would not be 
necessary. 
• Enforcement of an incentive payment program would 
consist of ensuring that project owners follow through on 
their commitments, and would not require tracking sys-
tems or legal rules for establishing ownership of emission 
reductions.
The scrutiny required for incentive payment programs would 
differ from offset programs in degree, not in kind. Quantify-
ing the effects of an incentive program–and making sure that 
mostly “additional” reductions were being funded–would be 
important in order to ensure that funds are not wasted. The 
consequences of any errors, however, would be no different 
from those of any subsidy program designed to achieve a public 
benefi t, such as programs to promote energy effi ciency or soil 
conservation.33 Unlike carbon offsets, errors in quantifi cation 
would not undermine the achievement of net GHG reductions, 
the primary goal of a cap-and-trade system. 
Finding an Optimal Approach 
Offset projects are often sought as opportunities to lower 
capped entities’ cost of complying with a cap-and-trade 
program. If emission reductions outside the cap are cheaper 
than reductions inside the cap, offsets allow the same overall 
emissions to be achieved at lower cost. Unfortunately, the set-
ting of overall emissions reductions goals is often considered 
separately from the identifi cation of offset project opportuni-
ties – and without consideration for what an optimal approach 
to emission reductions might look like across both capped and 
uncapped sectors of the economy. 
Rather than pursuing a piecemeal approach, policymakers 
should consider a cap-and-trade program and other policy 
mechanisms for reducing emissions together, such that the 
overall package of policies is as environmentally effective 
and economically effi cient as possible. As described above, 
some categories of uncapped reductions may be better served 
through policy mechanisms other than offsets. The downside 
to excluding some types of activities from an offset program is 
that doing so may raise the cost of compliance with an emissions 
cap. However, if setting emissions goals, identifying eligible 
offset project types, and designing other policy mechanisms 
to address uncapped emissions are considered in tandem, the 
overall cost to society of addressing climate change could be 
reduced.
Section IV - Conclusions and 
Recommendations
The analysis presented in this brief is not intended to suggest 
that entire categories of activities, such as carbon sequestra-
tion activities, should be categorically excluded from a U.S. 
carbon offset program. It does suggest, however, that U.S. 
policymakers need to carefully consider the various options for 
achieving GHG emission reductions in “uncapped” sectors of 
the economy. Carbon offset programs are attractive for many 
reasons, but they require the application of rigorous quantifi -
cation, verifi cation, and enforcement criteria. Some types of 
activities are less likely to meet these criteria than others, and 
many activities involving soil or forest carbon sequestration 
are at an inherent disadvantage. Policymakers should look 
holistically at the range of options for reducing emissions at 
uncapped sources, and set targets for capped sources as part 
of an overall suite of climate change policies. 
In designing a U.S. carbon offset program, policymakers 
should:
• Identify how much uncertainty is acceptable in quan-
tifying the emission reductions (or net sequestration) 
from offset projects, taking into account measurement 
uncertainty, baseline uncertainty, and leakage. Although 
there will be no quantitatively “right” answer, policymak-
ers should decide the maximum level of allowable risk of 
overstating real, additional emission reductions.
• Evaluate whether emission reductions (or net sequestra-
tion) from specifi c kinds of projects can be reliably quan-
tifi ed within the acceptable range of uncertainty, taking 
into account existing protocols.
• Decide on an appropriate mechanism for insuring 
against, and compensating for, reversals in carbon seques-
tration.
• Evaluate the transaction costs for different kinds of proj-
ects associated with meeting acceptable levels of quantifi -
cation uncertainty, and with insuring against reversals.
• Decide whether specifi c types of projects can cost-effec-
tively meet the requirements of a carbon offset program, 
or whether they should instead be realized through regu-
lations or incentive programs.
• Consider the level of emissions caps in light of an overall 
package of policies aimed at both capped and uncapped 
sources.
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Notes
 1. Although the focus of this brief is on U.S. domestic offsets, the same 
technical issues presented here will arise in the context of certifying 
international carbon offsets. Quantifi cation uncertainties and risks 
may be even greater for projects undertaken in developing countries, 
and similar question may arise about the most effective policy ap-
proaches for different types of activities. See, for example, Kanninen, 
M., et al., 2007. Do Trees Grow on Money? The Implications of 
Deforestation Research for Policies to Promote REDD. Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Jakarta.
 2. This paper uses the term “GHG reductions” to refer to both reduc-
tions in GHG emissions as well as increased removal and sequestra-
tion of GHGs (mainly CO2) from the atmosphere.
 3. Because the effect of greenhouse gases is global, it does not matter 
where they are reduced. Carbon offsets can also involve the removal 
of CO2 (the primary GHG responsible for climate change) from the 
atmosphere by activities that sequester carbon, including tree planting.
 4. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) analysis of the 
Climate Security Act of 2008 found that the use of offsets would have 
a signifi cant effect on the cost of the program. The report concluded 
that if domestic offsets and international credits were not allowed, 
allowance prices would increase by 93% compared to the bill as writ-
ten. EPA Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 
2008, March 14, 2008. http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/
s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf.
 5. The terms “offset credit,” “offset allowance,” and “carbon offset” are 
often used interchangeably.
 6. Some reduction categories that are covered by a domestic cap (and 
therefore ineligible as domestic offsets) may still qualify as interna-
tional offsets if the reductions occur at uncapped sources outside the 
U.S.
 7. The concept of air emission offsets originated under the “New 
Source Review” program established by the United States’ Clean Air 
Act. Under this program, offsets are required to be “real, creditable, 
quantifi able, permanent, and federally enforceable.” These basic 
criteria have been modifi ed and adopted in a general form under 
a variety of other offset programs, including programs for carbon 
offsets. Current carbon offset programs (including, for example, the 
one established by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the 
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northeastern United States) generally require that offsets must be 
“real, surplus, verifi able, permanent, and enforceable” or some close 
variation thereof. See, for example, Liepa, I., 2002. Greenhouse Gas 
Offsets: An Introduction to Core Elements of an Offset Rule. Climate 
Change Central, Alberta, Canada.
 8. For a full elaboration of quantifi cation and accounting principles for 
offset projects, see World Resources Institute and World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 2005. The Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol for Project Accounting. Washington, D.C. / Geneva, Chap-
ter 4. Available at http://www.ghgprotocol.org. 
 9. International Emissions Trading Association, 2007. Expanding 
Global Emissions Trading: Prospects for Standardized Carbon Offset 
Crediting. Prepared by World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfi le.php?docID=2730.
 10. Ibid.
 11. One option to accommodate these kinds of projects would be to 
allow limited use of project-specifi c additionality tests. For example, 
regulators could decide to treat methane capture projects at small 
landfi lls as automatically additional, but allow a project-specifi c 
analysis for projects at large landfi lls (where methane capture is often 
required and therefore baselines are more uncertain) rather than 
automatically rejecting them.
 12. The average residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere is around 100 
years. U.S. EPA. http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/
content/Glossary.html#Lifetime.
 13. WRI and WBCSD, 2005. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol for Project 
Accounting. Washington, D.C. / Geneva; and ISO 14064, Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, 2006.
 14. See, for example, WRI and WBCSD, 2005. The Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol for Project Accounting. Washington, D.C. / Geneva, 
Chapter 3; and Trexler, M., D. Broekhoff, and L. Kosloff, 2006. “A 
Statistically-Driven Approach to Offset-Based GHG Additionality 
Determinations: What Can We Learn?” in Sustainable Development 
Law & Policy, Volume VI, Issue 2, Winter 2006. 
 15. Under a cap-and-trade program, reductions at covered sources (even 
if they are covered “upstream” from the actual point of emissions, 
e.g., at fossil-fuel processing or distribution facilities) will simply free 
allowances that can be used to emit more elsewhere. Total emissions 
will not change and no “offset” will occur. Issuing offset credits for 
such reductions would therefore result in double-counting and cause 
total emissions to rise.
 16. There may be a reason to rule out categories that will soon be 
covered by the emissions cap, as the benefi ts of capturing early 
reductions through offsets should be weighed against the administra-
tive effort of developing rules for a category that will soon become 
obsolete.
17. A project’s baseline and additionality are intimately related. Because 
the goal is to maintain net emissions at capped levels, the baseline for 
a project should in theory represent the emissions that would occur 
at the sources it affects in the absence of a carbon offset market. Ad-
ditionality represents the extent to which project emissions are lower 
than the baseline.
18. For example, see http://ts.nist.gov/MeasurementServices/Calibra-
tions/fl ow.cfm. 
19. Sutter, C., and J.C. Parreno, 2007. “Does the Current Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) Deliver Its Sustainable Development 
Claim? An Analysis of Offi cially Registered CDM Projects.” Climatic 
Change 84: 75-90.
20. Joint Implementation Network, et al., 2003. Procedures for Account-
ing and Baselines of JI and CDM Projects (PROBASE): Final Report. 
The European Commission, Fifth Framework Programme, p. 33. 
Available at: http://www.jiqweb.org/probase/. Baseline uncertainty 
can be high because there may be multiple alternatives for a boiler 
upgrade, there is uncertainty about baseline operating conditions, 
and there may be other reasons for undertaking these projects (e.g., 
an old boiler may have been due for replacement).
 21. For example, see Brown, S., 2002. “Measuring, Monitoring, and Ver-
ifi cation of Carbon Benefi ts for Forest-Based Projects.” Philosophical 
Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 
Vol. 360, No. 1797, Carbon, Biodiversity, Conservation and Income: 
An Analysis of a Free-Market Approach to Land-Use Change and 
Forestry in Developing and Developed Countries (Aug. 15, 2002), 
pp. 1669-1683; and Kerr, S., et al., 2004. Tropical Forest Protection, 
Uncertainty, and the Environmental Integrity of Carbon Mitigation 
Policies. Motu Working Paper 04-03. http://motu-www.motu.org.nz/
wpapers/04_03.pdf.
 22. Murray, B.C., McCarl, B.A., Lee, H., 2004. “Estimating Leakage 
from Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs.” Land Econ. 80(1), 
109-124.
 23. Kim, M., B. McCarl, T. Butt, 2005. Uncertainty Discounting for 
Land-Based Carbon Sequestration. http://agecon2.tamu.edu/people/
faculty/mccarl-bruce/papers/1121.pdf 
 24. Ibid; and http://www.envtn.org/LBcreditsworkshop/Uncertainty_In-
tro.pdf 
 25. http://www.envtn.org/LBcreditsworkshop/Uncertainty_Intro.pdf; 
baseline carbon uncertainties for forest protection in Costa Rica 
range up to 54% for a single standard deviation.
 26. Murray, B.C., B.A. McCarl, H. Lee, 2004. “Estimating Leakage from 
Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs.” Land Econ. 80(1), 109-124. 
See also Murray, B., 2008. Leakage from an Avoided Deforestation 
Compensation Policy: Concepts, Empirical Evidence, and Corrective 
Policy Options, Nicholas School for Environmental Policy Solutions, 
Duke University. http://www.env.duke.edu/institute/wp-leakage.pdf
 27. Cordeiro, M., and L. Schipper, 2008 (forthcoming). Measuring the 
Invisible: Quantifying Emission Reductions From Transport Solu-
tions. EMBARQ / World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. 
 28. Ibid.
 29. Ibid.
 30. See, for example, WRI and WBCSD, 2005. The Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol for Project Accounting. Washington, D.C. / Geneva, Chap-
ter 5.
 31. The most extensive study of “transaction costs” for carbon offset proj-
ects indicates that existing forestry offset projects (almost exclusively 
serving the voluntary market), have faced higher monitoring and ver-
ifi cation costs than other projects, and may face higher costs under 
a regulatory program to address permanence and leakage concerns. 
Total transaction costs for forestry projects have ranged from one 
to 19 percent of total project costs, and have amounted to around 
$0.30 to $0.70 per ton of CO2. The study notes that “insurance costs” 
to compensate for reversibility could signifi cantly increase costs for 
forestry projects. See Antorini, C. and J. Sathaye, 2007. Assessing 
Transaction Costs of Project-based Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trad-
ing. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL-57315. 
3 2. For further discussion of this approach, see Hayes, D., 2008. Getting 
Credit for Going Green: Making Sense of Carbon “Offsets” in a Car-
bon-Constrained World. Center for American Progress, Washington, 
DC.
 33. For a discussion of incentive program evaluation issues, see (for 
example): National Action Plan for Energy Effi ciency, 2007. Model 
Energy Effi ciency Program Impact Evaluation Guide. Prepared by 
Steven R. Schiller, Schiller Consulting, Inc.; and Heimlich, R., 2000. 
“Establishing Effective Incentives in Practice: the Role of Valua-
tion and Infl uence of Other Factors” in Valuing Rural Amenities, 
OECD, Paris, pp.129-160.
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